One of the 11 areas that the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) report includes in ranking a country’s business environment is paying taxes. The background study for DB 2017, Paying Taxes 2016 claims that its emphasis is “on efficient tax compliance and straightforward tax regimes.”
Its ostensible aim is to aid developing countries in enhancing the administrative capacities of tax authorities as well as reducing informal economic activities and corruption, while promoting growth and investment. All well and good, until we get into the details.
First, the Report advocates not only administrative efficiency, but also lower tax rates. Any country that reduces tax rates, or raises the threshold for taxable income, or provides exemptions, gets approval.
Second, it exaggerates the tax burden by including, for example, employees’ health insurance and pensions and charges for public services like waste collection and infrastructure or environmental levies that the businesses must pay. The IMF’s Government Financial Statistics Manual correctly treats these separately from general tax revenues.
Third, by favourably viewing countries that lower corporate tax rates (or increase threshold and exemptions) and negatively considering those that introduce new taxes, DB is essentially encouraging tax competition among developing countries.
Economist and Triple Crisis contributor Jayati Ghosh recently moderated, at a book launch event in Geneva, a discussion of the new book The Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development. This is the final part in a four-part series, from The Real News Network, featuring that discussion. The full series is available here.
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Asia’s financial crisis came a decade before the global crisis, but it has had a lasting influence and left a legacy that could sow the seeds for the next global crisis.
How did the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 differ to the one that broke in the US and Europe in 2008?
The Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 was similar to the 2008 global financial crisis in that it was also the product of speculative bubbles in real estate and the stock market created by the search for high profits by finance capital. The difference was the role of currency speculators and hedge fund operators in hastening the bursting of the bubble and the collapse of the real economy; these actors played a negligible role in the 2008 crisis. These speculators, led by George Soros’ Quantum Fund, targeted the overvalued currencies of the Asian economies, particularly the Thai baht, betting on the probability that they would be devalued relative to the dollar owing to investor fears that the bubbles would burst, thus accelerating the devaluation of the currencies and making tremendous profits once the Asian currencies were devalued. Had the speculators not been active, the bubbles would still have burst and the real economy would still have entered into severe crisis, but the “landing” would have probably been less rough.
Where the uniqueness of the 2008-2009 crisis lay was in the fatal marriage of a real estate bubble with financial engineering. Tremendous amounts of cash flowed into real estate that were plowed into loans, a great many of them of dubious quality because the debtors’ capacity to repay the loans was questionable– thus the term subprime loans. Financial engineering allowed mortgage originators to slice, dice, and package these loans into securities that were then sold to banks and other financial institutions, which then resold them to other banks and financial institutions. When the mortgage holders could no longer service their mortgages, the quality of the loans was drastically impaired. But billions of dollars of these now toxic securities were circulating in the global financial system, upending the balance sheets of the US and foreign banks and institutions that held them and driving many, like Lehman Brothers, to bankruptcy, and others, like Citi and the German regional banks, requiring a massive government rescue.