Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, guest bloggers
The European Leaders agreed in principle at their meeting in Brussels on the 8th/9th of December 2011 to adopt tougher sanctions on the euro area countries that break the ‘new’ rules of what used to be the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), what is now called the ‘fiscal compact’ (FC). The FC requires that tax and spending plans be checked by European officials before national governments intervene. There will be automatic actions against those countries that are deemed to have budget deficits that are too large. In effect the new agreement tightens the rules of the old SGP, but with no apparent improvement, as the FC retains the principles of the previous SGP but with the one addition that breaking the deficit rules may actually be punished in some way.
The limits of the fiscal compact (as in the SGP) are in effect to balance overall budget over the cycle and limit the national budget deficit in any year to a maximum of 3 per cent of GDP. Under the fiscal compact the 3 per cent limit is retained, and the balanced overall budget is formulated as ‘structural budget’ to not exceed 0.5 per cent of GDP, and this is to be written into national constitutions or equivalent. In place of the previous threat of a 0.2 per cent of GDP ‘fine’ for exceeding the 3 per cent limit (though never implemented even though there were 40 cases where the 3 per cent limit was breached), there will be automatic consequences, including possible sanctions, unless a qualified majority of euro area countries is opposed.
It is readily apparent that the ’fiscal compact’ does nothing to address the perceived problems of national governments with large budget deficits, which cannot be funded through capital markets, except insofar as it somehow changes the European Central Bank’s attitudes to directly or indirectly funding those deficits. More seriously it does nothing to address the major problem of the Economic and Monetary Union, namely the large current account imbalances – ranging from a surplus of 7 per cent in the case of Germany to deficit of 10 per cent in the case of Greece (figures for 2010).