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Frank Ackerman

Climate science paints an ever-more-detailed picture: irreversible, catastrophic events are becoming increasingly likely as greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise. Climate economics, particularly in its policy applications, lags behind: leading models and analyses frequently ignore the extreme risks and the intergenerational aspect of the problem – and rely on simplistic and dated interpretations of the underlying science. Yet the state of the art has progressed rapidly, in the research literature on climate economics as well as science.

To address this problem, Liz Stanton and I wrote Climate Economics: The State of the Art, which has just been published by Routledge. Our book grew out of a request from the World Wildlife Fund for an update on climate economics since the Stern Review. In that 2006 review, commissioned by the British government, Nicholas Stern argued persuasively for a new approach to the economics of climate change, emphasizing arguments for a very low discount rate and a focus on catastrophic risks.

As we explain, both science and economics have continued to advance since Stern’s path-breaking work. After a review of “climate science for economists,” we examine three major areas: the treatment of climate damages in economics; new developments in economic theory; and the economics of mitigation and adaptation. Here are a few highlights from our book:

Recent studies suggest that peak temperatures, once reached, will persist for centuries, if not millenia. Mitigation scenarios have often assumed that the world can “overshoot” a target such as 2°C of warming and then come back to it through later emission reductions; since this option is not available, much more stringent reductions are needed for climate stabilization.

There is essentially no basis for the projection of future climate damages in many models. The use of simple, often quadratic, “damage functions” shapes the results of leading climate economics models, solely on the basis of modelers’ guesses. Empirical research, meanwhile, is finding increasingly ominous evidence of climate damages in agriculture, forestry, ocean acidification, and other areas.

Innovative new approaches to the economics of catastrophic risk have proliferated, especially in the debates around Martin Weitzman’s “dismal theorem.” Weitzman proved that if climate outcomes are sufficiently uncertain and the costs of worst-case outcomes (such as extinction of the human race) are unbounded, then the marginal benefit of emission reduction is literally infinite. This conclusion is hard to refute, but impossible to incorporate into standard economic methods for policy analysis. Responses to Weitzman’s 2009 publication have examined conditions under which benefits of climate mitigation might be finite, and have proposed new frameworks for understanding extreme risk.

Other areas of theoretical advances, to date found largely in research articles, include new approaches to discounting and intergenerational policy analysis; applications of frameworks for decision-making under uncertainty; and, perhaps less successfully, attempts to deal with the global nature of the climate externality and the need for international cooperation.

How much will it cost to reduce emissions and stabilize the climate? The economics of mitigation depends on the future costs of emission-reducing technologies, which are in part endogenous – since they are subject to learning effects, of uncertain strength. The net costs of mitigation also depend on the notoriously volatile prices of fossil fuels, a key uncertainty that is often overlooked in climate economics.

One much-debated area has been addressed by empirical research: the “rebound effect,” in which energy efficiency lowers costs and allows increased energy consumption, turns out to be real but relatively small in practice. There is no reason to believe that the rebound effect negates the value of energy efficiency.

The widespread interest in the economics of adaptation has led to relatively little research to date. Analysis is often stymied by the extremely site-specific nature of adaptation, and the difficulty of distinguishing between climate adaptation and other goals such as resilience, disaster preparedness and recovery, and economic development.

These and countless other topics are explored in Climate Economics: The State of the Art, with more than 500 citations to the recent research literature. Anyone involved in climate economics, science, or policy will find it to be an invaluable resource

Triple Crisis Welcomes Your Comments. Please Share Your Thoughts Below.

5 Responses to “Climate Economics: The State of the Art”

  1. ZielonyGrzyb says:

    But 85 pounds sterling is a lot of money… Is there any meaningful difference between the book and the original report published online some 1,5 years ago?

  2. I agree, the cost is unfortunately high; authors don’t get to set the prices that publishers charge for books (we would have priced it much lower). Can you persuade your library to buy a copy?

    In terms of what’s new: We did a substantial update, reviewing much more literature – the book covers research published through early 2012, more than a year beyond the time span covered in the original report version. We did some reorganization, which clears up the structure of the book, and added some new explanatory writing. And in terms of its usefulness to researchers, a book published by Routledge undoubtedly makes for a better academic citation than a NGO report.

    With all that said, there are of course significant similarities to the earlier report, and passages of text carried forward, either unchanged or changed only by the addition of newer citations along with the earlier ones.

  3. Great entry for a very useful book. Frank, I’m concerned about the macroeconomic framework that will condition the investments needed for mitigation, as well as the allocation of adequate funding for adaptation. Right now it is difficult to see how the wave of investments (that brings new emissions’ reduction technologies) will crystalize. On the other hand, most studies trying to quantify adaptation costs come up with underestimates because they typically use World Bank methodologies that simply add a percentage to current or historical expenditures in key sector in order to achieve “climate proofing”. But historical expenditures have been very low in developing countries, hence an underestimate. Finally, the neoliberal economic policy package has resulted in increased poverty worldwide: and as the IPCC reports accept, poverty brings vulnerability. The conclusion: we need serious changes in macroeconomic policies in order to meet the challenges of climate change. What do you think about this?

  4. Frank Ackerman says:

    For what it’s worth, the best estimates we could find of investments required for adaptation were at least an order of magnitude smaller than the costs of mitigation. (Although the existing estimates of adaptation costs aren’t worth much.) Both are challenges, but they are asymmetrical, both because of the different magnitude of costs, and because mitigation is an ultimate solution to the climate crisis, while adaptation is only a painkiller, not a cure.

    I agree that currently committed funds and likely near-term commitments are nowhere near what is needed for either adaptation to or mitigation of climate change. I see it more as a question of political will, or serious commitment to egalitarian and future-oriented goals, which is lacking at present – certainly in the US, and probably elsewhere. Fix that, and the macroeconomics would readily fall in line with the new national and international priorities.

  5. jjj says:

    Ramsey himself argued that it is “ethically indefensible” to apply a positive rate of pure time preference across different generations. . .(therefore) In the extreme, if the rate of time preference is 0, the Ramsey equation would yield a negative discount rate if output per capita is expected to decrease over time.

    The social cost of carbon in U.S. regulatory impact analyses:
    an introduction and critique
    Laurie T. Johnson & Chris Hope

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