The spikes in global food prices in 2007-8 served as a wake-up call to the global community on the inadequacies of our global food system. Commodity prices doubled, the estimated number of hungry people topped one billion, and food riots spread through the developing world. A second price spike in 2010-11, which drove the global food import bill for 2011 to an estimated $1.3 trillion, showed that while global leaders may now be alert to the problems, our agricultural systems remain deeply flawed.
Various inter-governmental institutions responded with alacrity to the food price alarms. But the most powerful governments remain resistant to reform. In the final two months of last year alone, the G20, the WTO, and the Durban Climate Summit all turned big opportunities for action into small communiqués of little import.
In our new report, “Resolving the Food Crisis: Assessing Global Policy Reforms Since 2007,” we find that the recent crisis has been a catalyst for important policy reforms, but governments have yet to address its underlying causes. By avoiding deeper structural reforms, the countries that dominate international agricultural markets leave the world at risk of another devastating food crisis.
The WTO ministerial meeting in Geneva last week failed to take any decisions on the question of food security. Indeed, we knew this would be the outcome even before the meeting began. As the ICTSD reported, two proposals on food security – both calling for exemptions from export restrictions for the world’s least developed and net food importing developing countries and for humanitarian food purchases by the World Food Programme – did not gain sufficient support at the WTO General Council meeting in late November to make the Ministerial agenda.
The fact that WTO members could not even support discussion of these specific measures does not bode well for the adoption of a broader and more comprehensive food security agenda at the WTO. The disagreements over rules on export restrictions have in fact served as a distraction from the broader food security issues that the WTO is already supposed to be working on.
ROME, OCTOBER 2011 – Multilateralism is in crisis. It is perhaps most evident in the painful and truly frightening failure of governments to come to grips with the implications of climate change. But it was also evident on a much less well-publicized stage in mid-October in Rome, where governments were gathered at the U.N. Committee on Food Security (CFS) to discuss food price volatility…
Triple Crisis bloggers Jennifer Clapp and Timothy A. Wise were recently interviewed by The Real News Network on why food security and commodity market speculation have recently fallen off the G20′s agenda. See Clapp’s recent post on how the G20 is derailing other institutions’ promising proposals to address food security.
At the meetings of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in Rome two weeks ago, disappointment was in the air. Expectations that the body would be able to agree to anything near what is needed to effectively address food price volatility had been seriously deflated, especially among civil society groups that were participating. What was the source of the trouble for the CFS? In a nutshell, it was the G20.
Earlier this year when France took on the chair of G20 and President Sarkozy announced his intention to use the forum to address food price volatility, there was initial excitement. Sarkozy promised to rein in excessive speculation on commodity futures markets that was seen to be contributing to price volatility and resulting food insecurity in the world’s poorest countries. There was also hope that the G20 would do away with market-distorting biofuel policies that also have contributed the volatility in food prices. There was even hope that the G20 might support the idea of reserves to manage food stocks and smooth prices.
As is customary now, the days of the business summit – the B20 – overlap with the Leaders’ Summit. In Cannes, the B20 is on November 2-3; the G20 is on November 3-4. At these Summits, the Presidents of the business confederations of the G20 countries, as well as 120 CEOs and Chairmen from global companies are delivering messages on 12 themes to the G20.
Many of these Ultra-High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) live in a rarified world according to the World Wealth Report 2011.A world far from the “99%” of the population represented by the “Occupy” protests or the civil society mobilizations in Nice on 2-3 November.
The G20 Advisory Group of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is already working closely with its counterparts on the June 18-19 G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico. That Summit will focus on seven themes: financial regulation and supervision; IFI, especially IMF, reform; the International Monetary System; financial inclusion; commodity price volatility and food security; green growth; and challenges for economic growth.
As the G20 takes its November meetings into the belly of the eurozone crisis, its food security agenda drifts toward irrelevance. Or worse. Early promises to address commodity speculation and market volatility have given way to tepid recommendations from G20 agricultural ministers in June and last month’s underwhelming communiqué from its Washington meeting on development, with its one snappy paragraph on food security issues. Now that finance ministers on their gilded steeds have turned and fled from the dragons of commodity speculation, the G20 is unlikely to slay any of the monsters threatening global food security – biofuels expansion, land grabs, speculation, price volatility, low public investment.
Fortunately, new research keeps coming, and it should inform the debate. The latest is from a group of researchers at New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI). As their name would indicate, these are modelers, and their paper, “The Food Crises: A quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion,” offers evidence that the underlying cause of rising food prices over the last decade is primarily the US corn ethanol program, while the cause of the two recent price spikes is speculation.
G-20 development ministers meet on Friday in Washington, D.C. One of the items on their agenda is a proposal developed in June for the G-20 agriculture ministers to allow the World Food Program to develop a pilot proposal for an emergency food reserve. The decision was possibly the most important outcome in an otherwise thin summit communiqué: however circumscribed, we know that food price volatility correlates with low stocks, and that providing stocks is a proven way to curb excessive volatility. We also know that in emergencies, in most of the poorest countries, it takes an average of 90 days to bring food into food-deficit areas. 90 days is too long. The costs of working in emergency conditions are also too high, in both resources and human life. There are cheaper, better ways to ensure food is available when it’s needed: a reserve in the food-vulnerable regions is one of them.
An extraordinary new process has been at work in the past few years: the aggressive entry of Indian corporations into the markets for agricultural land in Africa. At one level, this process is simply following the hoary old tradition in global capitalism, of firms (often supported by the governments of the originating countries) entering new areas in search of access to natural resources on preferential terms.
Several centuries ago, the growth of plantation agriculture in large parts of the western hemisphere was essentially the product of such a process. This was further facilitated by cross-border movements of labour (in the extreme case of African labour through slavery, then through indentured labour contracts largely from South Asia, then through supposedly more ”free” movements driven by lack of adequate income opportunities in the home countries). Together these flows generated production and trade patterns that were critical in shaping the international division of labour by the mid-twentieth century.