Martin Rapetti, Guest Blogger
Not so long ago, Argentina was considered a case of economic success. In 2001-02, the country suffered a severe crisis — a triple crisis involving the financial sector, the public debt and the balance of payments — that ranks as high as the worst crisis in Argentina´s history. However, in early 2002, soon after the devaluation of the peso, the default of the public debt and the collapse of the financial system, the economy began a sustained and very strong recovery that later on evolved into strong economic growth. By the end of 2006, GDP was 46% higher than the trough of 2002 and 17% higher than the previous peak of mid-1998; unemployment had shrunk from 22% to 8.7%, poverty from 58% to 28%, and extreme poverty from 28% to 9%. It is not difficult to understand why the experience became a very successful example of crisis resolution, especially for countries in the periphery of the European currency union like Greece.
Argentina’s post-crisis experience also represented a successful reference in terms of its macroeconomic policy regime. In the first years following the crisis, the authorities pursued macroeconomic policies that aimed to maintain a stable and competitive real exchange rate (RER) as a means to promote the expansion of dynamic tradable activities and thus promote economic development. The competitive RER was a key factor behind Argentina’s recovery and growth. Many economists consider a macroeconomic framework targeting a stable and competitive RER more development-friendly than the conventional inflation targeting.
Unfortunately, Argentina’s successful economic experience gradually began to fade away. As in the plot of Mario Vargas Llosa’s classic book Conversación en La Catedral, it is hard to determine at what precise moment this experience “f—d itself up”. A possible turning point was in early 2007, when the government fired civil servants of the National Bureau of Statistics (INDEC) and began to manipulate the official Consumer Price Index to openly hide the acceleration of inflation (since then the official inflation rate has been below 10% per year when actual inflation oscillated around 20-25% per year. The manipulation was later extended to other official statistics, including GDP). But regardless of the precise date, the issue is that the government gradually turned to an increasingly populist path based on excessively expansive fiscal, monetary and wage policies that fueled inflation. Instead of moderating the pace of aggregate demand, the government increasingly relied on the exchange rate as the main nominal anchor to curb inflation. This strategy was especially intense in 2010 and 2011. During these two years, domestic prices rose 54% whereas the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the domestic price of US dollar) only 12%. As a result the RER appreciated significantly.
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