Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer
We write this as people who have long argued that a currency union such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would need to be accompanied by what could be termed a fiscal union (see, for example, Arestis, P., McCauley, K. and Sawyer, M. (2001), “An Alternative Stability and Growth Pact for the European Union,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 113-130.)
It would then seem that we should be celebrating the proposed moves in EMU towards what is termed fiscal union; we rather, however, write of the dangers of the proposed fiscal union. The fiscal union, which we would view as required, would be one where there are substantial tax raising powers at the EMU level, say of the order of 10 per cent of EMU GDP (compare this with the Federal government in the USA raises taxes of the order of 20 per cent of GDP).
This fiscal union would involve a significant amount of fiscal transfer from richer countries to poorer countries: a proportional tax regime would raise absolutely more money in richer countries than in poorer countries, and a progressive one also relatively more. Provided that public expenditure did not exactly match tax revenue in a particular region, but rather was to some degree related to population size and to need, there would be transfer of resources from rich to poor.
Another key element of such a fiscal union would be the ability of the relevant Federal authority (Ministry of Finance) to operate a fiscal policy with deficits and surpluses as appropriate for the state of the economy. Further it would require the support of the European Central Bank in the operation of fiscal policy and willingness to buy where the bonds issued by that Federal authority.
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